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AT THE HELM
OF CHINA, INDIA, AND 
A TEMPERED GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
Global Chief Economist of The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Simon Baptist, discusses trends that are likely 
to shape the future global economic outlook, in this 
interview with Alvin Lee.
I’m expecting a mild 
slowdown in China 
triggered from the 
investment sector. 
And over the next 
fi ve years, I am most 
optimistic about India. 
2018 is shaping up to be an interesting 
year for global economics. How do the 
coming months look for China and India, 
the world’s most populous countries? 
2017 was a pretty good year, a lot of countries did reasonably 
well, marked by a turnaround in Europe and Japan, and China’s 
gentler-than-feared slowdown. Moving into 2018 it’s looking 
just as good, but there are some clouds gathering. 
I’m expecting a mild slowdown in China triggered from the 
investment sector. Unpaid corporate debt will lead to a slight cutback 
in bank lending, and I expect to see investment growth in China slow 
as a result. There will also be tighter controls over household loans. 
While this is a challenge, chances are the Chinese government 
will be able to control what happens. China has a good track 
record of dealing with transitions, and it’s likely they will do so 
again this time. China’s banking system is not the same as that 
in, say, the U.S. and Europe where things can be market-led; 
everything in China is state-led. The government has all the 
levers to engineer a controlled slowdown instead of being at 
the mercy of changing sentiment or market forces.
2YHU WKH QH[W ÀYH \HDUV , DPPRVW RSWLPLVWLF DERXW ,QGLD
Although India has always had that potential, what makes things 
different now? The answer is politics. The political scene is 
less fragmented than before. The BJP now controls both the 
SUHVLGHQF\ DQG SDUOLDPHQW ,W·V WKH ÀUVW WLPH LQ  \HDUV WKDW
one party has the majority in the Lower House, and they are on 
track to secure a majority in the Upper House as well. This has 
allowed the government to take some important steps. Financial 
regulations have made the banking system more robust. The 
central bank is run more effectively. And the Goods and Services 
Tax has harmonised taxes across Indian states, making India 
more of a national market.
India’s growth will be services-driven rather than manufacturing-
driven. I don’t think India will become a manufacturing 
powerhouse the same way that China did. It’s going to be 
a services powerhouse. From the industrial revolution in 
(XURSH WR -DSDQ LQ WKH V WKHQ 6RXWK .RUHD +RQJ .RQJ
Singapore and Malaysia to date, every country has achieved 
economic development through the manufacturing route. Yet 
India—and we’d put the Philippines into the same basket—is 
trying to go from lower- to middle-income status, and to higher-
income thereafter, through the services sector. 
So there is the open question: Can services deliver the 
same level of productivity growth? Can services deliver the same 
level of job creation needed to draw all those migrants from 
rural areas? How vulnerable is the services sector to things like 
automation and robotics? The answers will unfold with time.
The price of oil seems to be an area of 
concern in 2018. With oil prices now at 
their highest point in three years, are 
fundamentals pointing to a repeat of 
the days of US$120 per barrel? And what 
does that mean for the global economy?
I think there’s very little chance of oil going back to US$120 
a barrel. In fact, I think the current price of around US$70 is 
a little high. My feeling is that the long-term price of oil in the 
QH[W WRPRQWKVZLOO EH EHWZHHQ86 DQG86SHU
barrel, but it does depend on how well the OPEC countries can 
stick to their promises to cut production.
The big reason why we see the sudden rise in oil prices is 
that the U.S. has become a big oil producer. U.S. oil production 
is quite responsive to price. When prices go up, you see 
U.S. producers increase output, and when the prices decrease 
you see U.S. production decrease in response to market forces. 
It’s a different dynamic to the past where price formation was more 
fully controlled by the OPEC countries—led by Saudi Arabia—which 
make decisions about output somewhat independently of the 
price. Governments make decisions on the basis of how they 
want to affect the global market; they’re not responses to the 
market price. U.S. production, which is now significant and 
responds to the market price, will keep prices in a narrower 
band than before.
To what extent are oil prices affected 
by the shale producers? Are they back 
in the game now that prices are 
creeping up? Is oversupply likely as 
a result?
Absolutely. It’s all about the shale producers. They are more 
easily able to respond to price changes and we are now seeing 
that. U.S. oil output has just reached its record level, surpassing 
any historical level of output. It is in direct response to the fact 
that prices over the last six to eight months have been going 
up, and oil producers have been increasing output.
It’s a bit difficult to talk about over- or undersupply. 
Oil, like any product, is just a market. There’s a demand 
and supply, and the price will just move and these things will 
find a balance. What I do think will happen is that the 
increased production from the U.S. is going to put a downward 
pressure on oil prices over the following six months as 
the increased production comes through. The shale 
producers in the U.S. must make sure they don’t overinvest 
in new production, such that prices fall so much that they 
stop making money.
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Is Jerome Powell, chairman of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, likely to maintain the 
course of slow interest rate increases? 
What does that mean to the rest of the 
world and, specifically, Southeast Asia?
The new U.S. Fed is a bit more hawkish than the previous 
one. As such, they are going to be less worried about 
unemployment and more worried about inflation. The new 
Fed is more likely to prefer higher interest rates and 
lower levels of inflation than lower interest rates and higher 
levels of inflation. The bigger impact is the government 
spending increases and tax cuts announced in late 2017. 
These are going to create inflationary pressures and could 
cause interest rates to rise faster. 
I wouldn’t want to overstate that difference—it’s just a 
shift in emphasis. We still expect three rate rises from the 
Fed in 2019. And next year, maybe instead of expecting two or 
three rate hikes like we had under Janet Yellen, we might now 
expect three or four. The long-term perspective on U.S. interest 
rates is that they are still pretty low but the normalisation 
process, which has already started as Yellen has signalled, is 
likely to continue. But low unemployment and rising government 
spending means that barriers to raising interest rates are 
lower than in 2017.
What does that all mean for Southeast Asia? There might 
potentially be some downward pressure of currencies as those 
high interest rates induce people to put money into the U.S. 
rather than elsewhere. Also, countries with big current account 
GHÀFLWV VXFKDV ,QGRQHVLDZLOOKDYH WREHFRQVFLRXVDERXW WKHLU
domestic policy settings to make sure that they are attractive 
places for foreign direct investment, which is harder to move 
around compared to investment in the stock market or bond 
market that can more easily be shifted out and cause instability. 
Stock markets have been on a bull run. Is 
a correction due? Do central banks and 
governments have the tools to control 
the fallout?
Asset bubbles are something the world has to be wary about at 
the moment. It’s not just in the stock markets where there has 
been a big uptick in prices of assets. Many property markets have 
ULVHQDORWLQWKHODVWÀYH\HDUVRUVRVRKDYHVWRFNDQGERQGPDUNHWV
I do think the U.S. stock market is overvalued at the moment. 
The question you have to ask about the U.S. stock market is: Do 
you think U.S. tech companies are fundamentally changing the 
way we do business? And do you think those U.S. tech stocks 
are the companies who are going to reap future profits from 
that? Is the world going to use Amazon the way U.S. consumers 
use Amazon today? If you do, then you think all sorts of 
supermarket and retail businesses are going to go bust, and 
Amazon is going to get all the profits, for example. In this 
region, perhaps it’s Alibaba who’s going to be that company, 
SHUKDSV %DLGX RU PD\EH /D]DGD RU VRPH RWKHU UHJLRQDO ÀUP 
If so, we might think U.S. stocks are a little bit stretched.
Is 2018 the year of the cryptocurrency 
crash?
Like most economists, I’m currently a little sceptical about 
cryptocurrencies. But it’s our nature to be sceptical about 
something that challenges a fundamental unit of economy 
such as money, which has been running for such a long time. 
Money is only useful to the extent that other people accept it. 
Money has no value in and of itself. The paper or plastic of 
which it is made is worth nothing, but it’s worth something 
because the next person you give it to is going to accept it.
Therein lies the big challenge for bitcoin. I can see 
bitcoin, or cryptocurrencies in general, having uses in illegal 
transactions. Or where there is a need for some kind of 
secrecy desired by those taking part in the transaction. Or 
perhaps as in the case of China where people want to get 
around capital controls—it’s an unofficial way of moving 
money in and out of the country. So that provides a base for 
cryptocurrency usage.
But I don’t think governments are going to sit back and 
allow cryptocurrencies to take over the role of normal money. 
Governments do have the power to regulate these sorts of things. 
The supporters of cryptocurrencies say they are beyond the 
LQÁXHQFH RI JRYHUQPHQWV EXW WKDW·V MXVW EHFDXVH JRYHUQPHQWV
haven’t regulated cryptocurrencies yet. When governments see 
cryptocurrencies eroding their ability to raise tax, for example, I 
think they will intervene fairly quickly.
I think the tipping point is close. A lot of regulators are 
talking about cryptocurrencies as a top priority. Another thing 
that could happen is national governments could launch their own 
cryptocurrencies (ed: Venezuela launched the Petro on February 20, 
2018, two weeks after this interview was conducted). You might say 
WKHUHDUHVRPHEHQHÀWV IURPEORFNFKDLQ WHFKQRORJ\ WKDWXQGHUOLH
those cryptocurrencies that could also be used by central banks 
DQGQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV WKHPVHOYHV ,I WKRVHEHQHÀWV DUH UHDO 
then we will see governments setting up cryptocurrencies.
This interview was conducted on February 5, 2018, following a talk by 
Simon Baptist at Singapore Management University.
Simon Baptist 
is Global Chief Economist of The Economist Intelligence Unit
Alvin Lee 
is the Editor of Perspectives@SMU at Singapore Management University
How significantly will Brexit affect global 
growth prospects for 2018? Will the 
associated issues–trade, immigration 
and finance–cast a wider shadow on 
EU reforms?
%UH[LW LV DIIHFWLQJ WKH8. HFRQRP\ DOUHDG\ EXW E\ OHVV WKDQ 
most economists expected after the vote happened. I also 
expected it to have a more negative impact immediately. One 
of the reasons the British economy did well was that the currency 
FUDVKHG8. H[SRUWV EHFDPH D ORW FKHDSHU ZKLFK KHOSHG WKH
manufacturing sector. Also, the rest of Europe ironically had a 
good couple of years–there was a notable turnaround in France– 
DQG WKH UHVW RI(XURSH LV WKH ELJJHVWPDUNHW IRU8. H[SRUWV 
Those two factors have come together. Additionally, consumer and 
business sentiment have held up pretty strongly after Brexit.
I think the change for this year that we can anticipate is that 
businesses are now getting a bit more worried. We’re only one 
year out from when the exit has to happen based on the current 
timetable, and there is still no deal, not even a proper proposal. 
Businesses are holding off on some investments and waiting 
until things become a little clearer. But that all mainly affects the 
8. , GRQ·W WKLQN LW KDV JOREDO UDPLÀFDWLRQV DW WKLV SRLQW
So in a nutshell, economic fundamentals point to the 
following outlook for the remainder of 2018: Oil prices will 
not reach US$120, more U.S. Fed rate hikes are expected, and 
Brexit’s fallout will remain largely within Europe.
The World Bank, in its January 2018 edition 
of Global Economic Prospects, wrote that 
“growth in investment and in total factor 
productivity (TFP) has been declining over 
the past five years” and that demographic 
trends are likely to hold back future growth. 
What does that mean with regard to 2018?
7KH ORQJWHUPSURGXFWLYLW\ WUHQG RYHU WKH SDVW  RU  \HDUV 
has been downwards. Productivity growth in the OECD was 
UXQQLQJ DW WKUHH WR IRXU SHUFHQW VRPH   \HDUV DJR EXW 
now it’s running at between zero and one percent, and in good 
years two percent.
Why is that? It’s one of the biggest questions in economics 
at the moment. Over the last 12 months, the worries about the 
productivity slowdown being permanent have receded somewhat. 
There are two schools of thought. One is the technology 
optimists who think that new things are going to come along, 
such as automation and artificial intelligence, genetics, 
biotechnology etc. that are going to, in the coming decades, 
PHDQZH DUH JRLQJ WR EH D ORWPRUH HIÀFLHQW WKDQZH DUH QRZ
However, there are other people who say, ‘Well, all the 
big inventions have happened in the last century, or have been 
brought to scale in the last century.’ These are things such as 
electricity, cars, running water, these sorts of things. Innovation 
today such as Facebook and Twitter—do these things add to 
productivity? Probably not. They make life more fun, which is 
worthwhile, but maybe Facebook is not going to have the same 
LPSDFW RQ WKH JOREDO HFRQRP\ DV HOHFWULÀFDWLRQ GLG 6R WKDW·V 
the pessimistic view. 
Which one will win out? I guess we won’t know. There have 
been many times in the past when people have been worried 
about innovation running out and that we’ve used up all the good 
inventions. Over the past couple of hundred years, societies have 
somehow managed to come up with new inventions. On balance, 
I’m probably an optimist. 
Economic fundamentals point to the 
following outlook for the remainder of 
2018: Oil prices will not reach US$120, 
more U.S. Fed rate hikes are expected, 
and Brexit’s fallout will remain largely 
within Europe.
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